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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the relation between matching level and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs using listed firm 
(KOSPI) data in Korea. This study is based on prior research that reported that the higher the matching level, the 
less the noise included in accounting earnings and the higher the earnings quality. Karpoff (1986), Bamber (1987), 
Ajinkya, Atiase, & Gift (1991) and Dormeier (2011) explain that if there are different interpretations among 
investors regarding intrinsic value of a company, as a result, the trading volume can represent investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs. 
 
Whereas the previous studies on matching level analyzed what kind of impact matching level improvement has on 
earnings quality, accumulated market adjusted return, foreign ownership, future earnings response coefficient 
(FERC) and bond credit rating. However, these studies have problems in measuring the matching level. So this 
study suggested additional proxy on matching level in addition to the proxy used in previous studies. Specifically, we 
analyzed the matching level model of Paek’s (2011b) by using the Prais-Winsten estimation method and then used 
the calculated explanatory power (Adj.R2) as a proxy for the additional matching level. 
 
To empirically analyze hypothesis of this study, we used firm-year observation from 4,094 firms listed on Korean 
Stock Exchange over the period from 2003 to 2011. We found that matching level regression coefficient consistently 
showed significantly negative values for each measurement. Moreover, we analyzed additionally by measuring the 
calculated regression coefficient (β2) of current expenses as matching level response coefficient after analyzing 
Dichev and Tang’s (2008) matching level measuring model by Prais-Winsten estimation method. It showed that 
regression coefficient of the current expenses and trading volume have negative correlation. This is consistent with 
this study, and it can be analyzed that as matching level improves, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease. 
 
According to microeconomics theory of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), trading volume is explained to 
affect price changes. However, accounting and related studies analyze the information effect by using price change 
only. In this sense, this study is meaningful in that it conducted an analysis on the information effect of matching 
level through trading volume. In addition, this study contributes to understand the microscopic structure of the 
capital market. 
 
Keywords: Earnings Quality; Matching Level; Trading Volume 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this study is to analyze the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between 
matching level and investors' heterogeneous beliefs. Based on that the assumption that matching level 
reduces the noise included in earnings, we determined if investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease as 
matching level increases.  
 
Karpoff (1986), Bamber (1987), Ajinkya et al. (1991) and Dormeier (2011) explain that if there are different 
interpretations among investors regarding intrinsic value of a company, the trading volume can represent investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs. Studies of trading volume report that when investors’ beliefs regarding intrinsic value of the 
firm are heterogeneous, it has positive relation with unexpected earnings, but a negative relation with the quality of 
accounting information (e.g., accruals quality) of asymmetric information (e.g., analysts’ earnings forecasts) and 
T 
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information environment such as company size and age (Karpoff, 1986; Bamber, 1987; Ajinkya et al., 1991; Jung, 
1990; Choi & Shin, 1997; Choi & Yoon, 2012). 
 
Whereas the previous studies on matching level analyzed what kind of impact matching level improvement has on 
the earnings quality, accumulated market adjusted return, foreign ownership, future earnings response coefficient 
(FERC) and bond credit rating (Roh, 2013; Lee, Goh, & Choi, 2013; Lee & Jung, 2014; Lee, 2014; Jung & Lee, 
2014). Previous studies of matching level use the methodology suggested by Paek (2011). 
 
Paek (2011b) measures matching level of each firm with calculated explanatory power (Adj.R2) after analyzing 
relation between current income and current expenses by ordinary least squares by using the data of each company’s 
rolling ten-year windows.  However, the model used by Paek (2011a) disregards the first auto correlation 
relationship that can occur econometrically. Therefore, Lee and Jung (2014) and Jung and Lee (2014) measure 
matching level by changing the measure used by Paek (2011b) to the form of difference (△) type. 
 
The model that Lee and Jung (2014) and Jung and Lee (2014) suggests was designed to solve the first 
autocorrelation problem that can arise in Paek’s (2011b) model, but if the time lag is set long-term, the difference 
amount can disappear to zero value. So we analyze the matching level model of Paek (2011b) by using the Prais-
Winsten estimation method and then use the calculated explanatory power (Adj.R2) as a proxy for the additional 
matching level. 
 
Investors’ heterogeneous beliefs were measured by trading volume, and trading volume was measured based on the 
methodology suggested by Morse (1981), Beaver (1968), Bamber (1987) and Ziebart (1990). By setting the trading 
volume as the dependent variable, after considering the effect of the control variable that the previous studies 
suggest in regression analysis that includes matching level as independent variable, matching level’s regression 
coefficient consistently showed significantly negative value for each measured value. Moreover, after analyzing 
Dichev and Tang (2008) matching level measuring model by Prais-Winsten estimation method, we analyzed the 
effect of matching level on investors’ heterogeneous beliefs by using calculated current expense repression 
coefficient (β2) According to the additional analysis, as the value of regression coefficient of current expense 
increases, trading volume decreases. In other words, as matching level improves investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 
decrease for the target investment company. 
 
According to microeconomics theory, trading volume affects price change (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, the 
impact of the information was analyzed by using only the price change in studies of accounting. We conducted an 
empirical analysis on the effect of information on matching level by trading volume. This study is expected to help 
us understand the capital market’s microscopic structure.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and presents the hypothesis. In 
Section III, we describe our methodology. We present descriptive statistics and the results of the empirical test in 
Section Ⅳ. SectionⅤconcludes with implications and limitations of the analysis.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Dichev and Tang (2008) explain that if contemporaneous correlation between current income and current expenses, 
in other words, matching level, is damaged, noise that included in the earnings increases. Paek (2011b) explains that 
if noise that is included in the earnings increases, earnings quality diminishes. Therefore, Paek (2011b) reports result 
that groups with high matching level have high earnings quality (e.g., earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
accruals quality, income smoothing, and earnings response coefficient). Dichev and Tang (2008) that investigated on 
the US (1,000 largest U.S. firms) also reported consistent results, and Dichev and Tang (2008) reported that as 
matching level increases, earnings persistence increases but earnings volatility decreases.  
 
In this context, studies on matching level have analyzed the relationship between company characteristic variable 
and matching level in Korea (Roh, 2013; Lee et al., 2013; Lee & Jung, 2014; Lee, 2014; Jung & Lee, 2014). 
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Previous studies of matching level analyzed the relationship of matching level with Foreign Ownership, analysts’ 
herding, asymmetric information (analyst’s forecasts), audit hours, the information effect of current earnings and 
future earnings, and bond credit rating.  
 
Chon (2003) explained that foreign investors make investment decisions for companies with high earnings quality. 
Lee (2014) conducted an analysis with the expectation that companies with a higher matching level would have 
higher foreign ownership. According to the analysis, there is a positive correlation between matching level and 
foreign ownership. Lee (2014) interpreted that as matching level increases, earnings quality improves and thus 
foreign ownership increases. 
 
Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper (2012) report that if the earnings quality increases, information risk 
(asymmetric information level) is decreased. It shows as matching level rises, uncertainty of information 
environment and asymmetric information level can fall.  
 
Kwon and Ki (2011) reports that the higher accrual quality, the higher audit risk, so auditors will spend more time 
auditing than when audited companies have a low (high) quality of accruals. Accrual quality, which is one of the 
audit risk criteria will increase as matching level improves (Paek, 2011b). In other words, as client’s matching level 
increases, less time is spent on auditing. Therefore, Jung and Lee (2014) reported results where there is negative 
relationship between matching level and audit hour. 
 
According to Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and Haw, Hu, and Lee (2012), higher the earnings quality (income 
smoothing, accruals quality) higher the share price relation with future earnings. Lee and Jung (2014) expected a 
positive relationship between matching level and future earning’s relation to share price. According to analysis 
results, as matching level increases, so does the future profit’s relation to share price. Lee and Jung (2014) 
interpreted that as matching level improves, the information effect of future earnings increases. 
 
In contrast, Roh and Lee (2012) studied the information effect of matching level through accumulated market 
adjusted return. According to the results of the analysis, information effect of earnings is higher in the group with a 
high matching level than in groups with a low matching level. With these results as a basis, they explained that 
matching level improves earnings predictability by reducing noise that is included in earnings. 
 
Yang and Seo (2014) analyzed the impact of matching level on assessment of bond credit rating. According to the 
analysis result, as matching level increases, so does the bond credit rating. According to Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
and LaFond (2006), as earnings quality (accrual quality and income smoothing) increases, bond credit rating goes up. 
The results of Yang and Seo (2014) are consistent with those of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006). 
 
The previous studies of matching level show that as matching level increases, noise that is included in earning 
decreases and the uncertainty of earning and the earnings. Therefore, previous studies of matching level report that 
as matching level improves, asymmetric information level and audit hour decreases, and foreign ownership, in 
formation effect of earning (future earning) and bond credit rating increase. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
According to the literature, heterogeneous (or differing) beliefs and trading volume have a positive relation (Karpoff, 
1986; Bamber, 1987; Ajinkya et al., 1991; Dormeier, 2011). These studies explain that because trading volume 
increases when there are heterogeneous beliefs in intrinsic value of a company, trading volume can signify 
heterogeneous beliefs among investors (Karpoff, 1986; Bamber, 1987; Ajinkya et al., 1991; Jung, 1990; Choi & 
Shin, 1997; Choi & Yoon, 2012). Therefore, studies of trading volume analyzed how much impact unexpected 
earnings, quality of accounting information (accruals quality), level of asymmetric information (analyst’s forecasts) 
and information environment (firm size, firm age) have on investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
 
Bamber (1987) reported that the magnitude of the trading volume to quarterly earnings announcement is positively 
related with the unexpected. Choi and Shin’s (1997) study of on Korean companies showed consistent results. Jung 
(1990) explained that new information causes various interpretations regarding expected (future) cash follow for 
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investors. The information that is included in the unexpected earnings seems to generate several interpretations 
regarding future cash flow for investors.  
 
However, Sohn, Ko, and Paik (2009) reported that if accruals quality is high, the positive relationship between 
unexpected earnings and trading volume decreases. In other words, if companies provide good quality accounting 
information, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs regarding unexpected earnings can be mitigated. 
 
Ajinkya et al. (1991) analyzed the relation between dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and trading volume. They found 
a positive relation between profit forecast dispersion and trading volume. Ziebart (1990) analyzed the relation 
between financial analysts’ forecasts dispersion change and analysts’ forecasts adjustments and abnormal trading 
volume. According to the result, there is a positive relation between analysts’ forecasts dispersion change and 
analysts’ forecasts and abnormal trading volume. Similarly, Choi and Shin (1997) analyzed relation between 
analysts’ forecasts dispersion for Korean companies and trading volume. They found that as analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion increases, so did trading volume. 
 
Jung (1990) analyzed relation between information environment and trading volume. Specifically, Jung (1990) has 
conducted an analysis on how information environment measured value impacts trading volume by measuring 
information environment with firm size and age. According to the analyzed results, as firm size is bigger and firm 
age is higher, trading volume is shown to decrease. Analysis result, as asymmetric information level is low and 
company information environment is outstanding, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs about target investment 
companies are to be decreased 
 
As we summarize the literature on trading volume, when there are investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on intrinsic value 
of a company, trading volume increases. Investors’ heterogeneous beliefs increase when earnings quality is low, and 
asymmetric information level (information environment) is high (low). 
 
Dichev and Tang (2008), Paek (2011b), Roh and Lee (2012) and Lee (2014) argued that as matching level increases, 
noise that is included in accounting earning decreases. Dichev and Tang (2008), Paek (2011b) and Roh and Lee 
(2012) reported that as matching level improves, uncertainty in accounting earning decreases and earnings quality 
consequently increases. If matching level acts as a factor to improve the earnings quality, it is expected that as 
matching level increases, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs on intrinsic value of a company will decrease. Therefore 
this study hypothesizes a negative association between matching level and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, as matching level increases, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs will decrease. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Methodology and Variable Definitions  
 
3.1.1 Model for Matching Level and Investors’ Heterogeneous Beliefs 
 
We used the following equation to analyze the effect of matching level on investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
 𝑇𝑉 𝐴𝑇𝑉 $,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃2$,& + 𝛽0𝑉𝐷$,& + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&	& + 𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝐺$,& + 𝛽:𝐿𝐸𝑉$,& + 𝛽<𝐵𝑂𝐷$,& +𝛽>𝑈𝐸$,& + 𝛽@𝐶𝐹$,& + 𝛽C𝐴𝐺𝐸$,& + 𝛽+)𝑌𝐷$,& + 𝛽++𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸$,& + 𝜀$,& (1) 
 
TV : Daily average trade volume 
ATV : Daily abnormal trade volume 
MAT : Matching level measured based on Paek (2011b) 
GMAT : Matching level measured based on Lee and Jung (2014) 
DMAT : Matching level measured based on Jung and Lee (2014) 
PMAT : Matching level measured based on Prais-Winsten methods 
VD : Voluntary disclosures (Voluntary disclosure level/ln((t-1) total assets)) 
SIZE : ln (total assets at the end of year) 
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BIG : 1 if the auditor is big 4, or 0 
LEV : Total liability/total assets at the end of year 
BOD : Percentage of abnormal outside directors 
UE : Unexpected earnings measured based on Han (2001) 
CFS : 1 if consolidated financial statements are announced, or 0 
AGE : ln (the consecutive number of months listed on KOSPI) 
YD : Dummy variable for year. 
ICODE : Dummy variable for industry. 
ε : Residuals 
 
Equation (1) β1 is a verification coefficient for the hypothesis, and for β1 to show consistent results with the 
hypothesis, it needs to show significant negative value. If β1 shows significant negative value, it can be explained 
that as matching level increases, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease. 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) reported that higher the disclosure level, the higher the liquidity of the shares. This 
suggests that as the amount of information provided by a company increases, so does trading volume. Therefore, we 
have included voluntary disclosure degree (VD) in the model to control the effect of voluntary disclosure level on 
trading volume. The level of voluntary disclosure was collected from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
System provided by the Korean Financial Supervisory Service. Firm size is included in the model to control the 
effect the firm size on the trading volume. Bhushan (1989) reported that as firm size increases, analyst following 
increases. It means that as firm size increases, asymmetric information can be low. Therefore, this study includes 
firm size (SIZE) in the model. We expect the regression coefficient of SIZE to be negative. Becker, DeFond, 
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) reported that big six auditors provide higher audit quality services to clients 
than do non-big six auditors. Therefore, we have included the auditor size (Big) in the model to control the effect the 
quality of audit has on trading volume. Size is expected to have a negative association with trading volume. Debt 
ratio is a variable representing firm’s financial risk and bankruptcy risk, we have included debt ratio (LEV) in the 
model to control the effect of these risks on trading volume. The regression coefficient of LEV is expected to have a 
positive value. We have included excess outside director rate (BOD) in the model to control the ownership structure. 
Kim and Kim (2007) reported that higher the outside director ratio, the more likely it is that the agent problem has 
been resolved, and Ko, Baik, and Ahn (2012) explained that companies with high outside director ratio will likely to 
have a more independent board of directors. However, Kim (2006) showed analysis results where excess outside 
director rate has no association with firm value. So, this study has included excess outside director rate(BOD) in the 
model to control the ownership structure, but a relationship is not expected.  
 
Bamber (1987) reported a positive relation between unexpected earnings and trading volume. According to Han 
(2001), unexpected earnings include the most information among the financial variables. For that reason, 
information included in unexpected earnings can trigger a variety of interpretations regarding future cash follow for 
investors, thus this study has included unexpected earning s(UE) in the model. Hwang (1995) explained that 
consolidated financial statement can provide additional information that each financial statement cannot provide. 
Therefore, in this study, we have included consolidated financial statement announcement (CFS) in the model. If 
consolidated financial statements provide additional information that each financial statement cannot provide, 
consolidated financial statements are expected to have positive relation with trading volume. Jung (1990) explained 
that firm age can show information environment. Jung (1990) reported that because higher the firm age, company 
information environment can be outstanding, thus there is negative relation between firm age and trading volume. 
However, Kwon and Moon (2012) explained as companies enter the decline phase in their life cycle, their 
opportunistic earnings management risk increases. In this case, firm age has a positive relation with trading volume. 
Therefore, this study has included firm age (AGE), but no relationship is expected. Lastly, year dummy and industry 
dummy are included in the model to control the year effect and industry dummy. 
 
3.1.2 Measuring of Investors’ Heterogeneous Beliefs  
 
This study has measured investors’ heterogeneous beliefs by trading volume. Trading volume used in this study was 
measured as equation (2) and equation (3). 
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Equation (2) and equation (3) are based on the methodology of Morse (1981), Beaver (1968), Bamber (1987) and 
Ziebart (1990). However, previous studies measured the trading volume with a limited window period (earning 
announcement date). Kim and Verrecchia (1994) explained that accounting earning announcement time has higher 
asymmetric information level than non-accounting earning announcement time. Therefore, this study measured the 
trading volume by using the law of large numbers. 
 
Firstly, equation (2) is average daily trading volume (TV), and this is stock trading volume for each company for 1 
year. Companies with higher investors’ heterogeneous beliefs have increased daily average trading volume (TV). 
 
 
 (2) 
 
 
TV : Average daily volume 
Vi, t : company’s trading date t days trading volume/ i company trading days t days number of listed shares 
TNF : Trading days in 1 year 
 
However, Equation (2) is limited in showing if daily average trading volume of each company had a positive 
abnormal or a negative abnormal trading volume. Therefore, this study measured daily abnormal trading volume 
(ATV). Equation (3) can be explain as if individual company’s daily abnormal trading volume (ATV) is bigger than 
zero, that individual company can be said to have positive abnormal trading volume. Reversely, if individual 
company daily abnormal trading volume (ATV) is smaller than zero, then that individual company can be said to 
have negative abnormal share trading volume. In this context, I believe when investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 
regarding intrinsic value of a company increase, daily abnormal trading volume (ATV) will show larger than zero 
value, but when investors’ heterogeneous beliefs are low, daily access trading volume will be smaller than zero. 
 
 
 (3) 
 
 
 
ATV : Daily abnormal trading volume 
εi,t : 𝑉$& − (𝛼I + 𝛽$𝑉J&) (actual trading volume-forecasted trading volume (market model, 𝛼I + 𝛽$𝑉J&) 
TNF : Trading days in 1 year 
 
3.1.3 Measuring of Matching Level (MATCH)  
 
Paek (2011b) measures matching level through ordinary least squares after setting the current income as dependent 
variable and current expense as independent variable as in the equation (4). Paek (2011b) measures the calculated 
Adj.R2 as matching level (MAT) after conducting OLS regression analysis by using each company’s current 
rolling10-year windows data. 
 𝑅𝐸𝑉$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐸𝑋𝑃$& + 𝛽0𝑉𝐷$,& + 𝜀$,& (4) 
 
RE : (Revenue + non-operating income) / average total asset 
EXP : (cost of sales + selling and administrative expense + non-operating expenses) / average total assets  
 
However, the methodology suggested by Paek (2011b) disregards the first autocorrelation relationship that can occur 
econometrically. Therefore, Lee and Jung (2014) and Jung and Lee (2014) measured matching level in equations (5) 
and (6) to resolve the first autocorrelation relationship that can appear in Paek (2011b). Specifically, Lee and Jung 
(2014) measured the calculated Adj.R2’ through OLS regression analysis as matching level(GMAT) after changing 
equation (4) as the first difference equation as in equation(5). Lee and Jung (2014) conducts OLS regression analysis 
without using a slope. 
 
𝑇𝑉$	MN = OP𝑉$&Q&R+ S 1𝑇MN  
𝐴𝑇𝑉 = OP 𝜖$&Q&R+ S 1𝑇MN  
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𝑅𝐸𝑉$,& − 𝑅𝐸𝑉$,&V+ = 𝛽0 𝐸𝑋𝑃$,& − 𝐸𝑋𝑃$,&V+ + 𝜀$,& − 𝜀$,&V+∆𝑅𝐸𝑉$,& = 𝛽0∆𝐸𝑋𝑃$,& + υ$,& (5) 
 
Please refer to equation (4) for the definitions of the variables. 
 
Whereas Jung and Lee (2014) measured matching level (DMAT) with a difference between ‘Adj.R2’ of equation (6) 
and ‘Adj.R2’ of equation (7) after conducting OLS regression analysis for equation (6) and equation (7) below. 
When measuring matching level with these methodology, Jung and Lee (2014) explained that the former and the 
next term expenses can measure the controlled matching level. 
 𝑅𝐸𝑉$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐸𝑋𝑃$,&V+ + 𝛽0𝐸𝐷𝑃$,& + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃$,&Y+ + 𝜀$,& (6) 
 𝑅𝐸𝑉$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐸𝐷𝑃$,&V+ + 𝛽0𝐸𝐷𝑃$,&Y+ + 𝜀$,& (7) 
 
Please refer to equation (4) for the definitions of the variables. 
 
The methodology of Lee and Jung (2014) and Jung and Lee (2014) is designed to resolved the first autocorrelation 
relationship that can appear in Paek (2011b), but when time lag increases, there is a problem that this different type 
can disappear as zero. In other words, if time is limited as certain period, the difference value does not go to zero, 
but if the time is set to be infinite, and then this difference value can become zero.  
 
This is also explained consistently in microeconomics theory. In other words, even if a certain market (industry) is 
currently monopolistic market, if entry barrier called ‘time’ is resolved, this market (industry) becomes fully 
competitive. The companies included in the perfect competition market operate in the optimal facility size and are 
reported to have normal profits only. It means that each company’s difference in total revenue and total cost can be 
zero in the long term. 
 
Moreover, as for the difference type equation as in Lee and Jung (2014) and Jung and Lee (2014), when the sample 
size is big, small observation loss is not a problem. However, when the sample is small, these observation losses can 
cause a problem where estimation cannot be the best linear unbiased estimator (Gujarati 2011). So, we measured the 
matching level by using the Prais-Winsten estimation method. 
 
Prais-Winsten estimation method can be used when there is the first autocorrelation. Specifically, this study used the 
calculated Adj.R2 as additional matching level measurement (PMAT) through equation (4) with Prais-Winsten 
estimation method. 
 
Whereas Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) explained that rolling 10-year windows for each company is 
necessary to calculate a firm-specific approach. Therefore, this study used a methodology suggested by Paek (2011b) 
and consistently each company’s rolling ten-year windows data to calculate MAT, GMAT, DMAT and PMAT. 
 
3.2 Sampling 
 
The sample used in this study consisted of non-financial firms that traded on Korea Stock Exchange during the 
sample period 2003 to 2011. In selecting the samples, the following limitations are applied: 
 
(1) Companies that can provide trading volume from 1994 to 2011, financial statement and audit report from 
KISVALUE (Korea Investors Service Inc) or TS-2000 database (Korea Listed Companies Association) 
(2) Companies whose total registered directors and outside directors and the number of voluntary disclosure 
can be collected from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System provided by the Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service 
(3) Companies whose financial year ended on December 31st and the audit report showing satisfactory mark 
and with positive asset level 
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The final samples consisted of 4,094 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the distribution of sample by year.1 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of sample by year 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Number 412 427 435 437 445 462 471 493 512 4,094 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of variables. Average, median, standard deviation and quartile of each variable 
were presented. Average (median) of Daily average trading volume (TV) was 0.0112(0.0052) and the standard 
deviation was 0.0213. And average(median) of daily abnormal trading volume (ATV) was -0.0010(-0.0035) and the 
standard deviation was 0.0185. 
 
In proxies of matching level, average(median) value of MAT was 0.8479(0.9369) and it was like the average (0.881) 
and the median (0.965) of Paek (2011b). Average(median) of GMAT was 0.776(0.8882) and average(median) of 
DMAT was 0.4680(0.3802). This is consistent with the view by Jung and Lee (2014). And average(median) of 
PMAT was 0.8783(0.9523), indicating that the average is somewhat smaller than the median. 
 
In the descriptive statistics for control variables, the average(median) of voluntary announcement degree 
0.0492(0.000). In Sohn, Jin, and Hua (2008), the corresponding average and median were 0.031 and 0.000 
respectively. So, the results of this study are consistent with the view by Sohn et al., (2008). Firm size (Size) 
average(median) is 26.4313 (26.1367). Average(median) of auditor size (Big) is 0.6378(1.0000), thus it means that 
about 63% of the sample companies are audited by big accounting firms. Average(Median) of Debt ratio (Lev) was 
0.4428(0.4496), thus the average and the median were similar. Average and median of excess outside director rate 
(BOD) was –0.0018 and 0.0000 respectively, thus it means that more than one half of the sample companies satisfies 
the legal outside director rate requirement. Average(median) of unexpected earnings was 0.0225(0.0027), somewhat 
smaller than average (0.056) by Han (2011). Average(median) of consolidated financial statement (CFS) was 0.5677 
(1.0000), thus about 56% of the sample companies publicly report consolidated financial reports. Average and 
median of company age(AGE) were 5.3152 and 5.4467 respectively, thus they are shown to be like the average 
(5.6002) by Jung (1990). 
 
 
  
                                                
1 Although not shown in the table, among the final sample of 4,094, there are 413 firms under Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products 
except Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals category, 315 firms under professional services, 311 firms under manufacture of basic metal 
products, and 217 firms under Manufacture of Electronic Components, Computer, Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and 
Apparatuses category, thus these 4 industries account for about 32%. Therefore, this study included industry dummy in the model in order to 
control the industry effect. 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min 25% Median 75% Max 
TV 0.0112 0.0213 0.0000 0.0022 0.0052 0.0118 0.5087 
ATV -0.0010 0.0185 -0.1383 -0.0076 -0.0035 0.0010 0.3094 
MAT 0.8479 0.2060 0.0043 0.8109 0.9369 0.9793 1.0000 
GMAT 0.7776 0.2565 0.0013 0.6824 0.8882 0.9613 0.9986 
DMAT 0.4680 0.3411 0.0011 0.1806 0.3802 0.7131 1.2816 
PMAT 0.8783 0.1770 0.0023 0.8573 0.9523 0.9845 1.0000 
VD 0.0492 0.1003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0649 1.6822 
SIZE 26.4313 1.4804 22.9058 25.3956 26.1367 27.2231 32.3055 
BIG 0.6378 0.4807 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
LEV 0.4428 0.1929 0.0007 0.2974 0.4496 0.5847 0.9930 
BOD -0.0018 0.1182 -0.5000 -0.0500 0.0000 0.0556 0.5500 
UE 0.0225 0.5221 -9.8625 -0.0550 0.0027 0.0723 7.4350 
CFS 0.5677 0.4955 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
AGE 5.3152 0.7551 0.0000 5.0434 5.4467 5.8992 6.5058 
The definitions of  the variables are as follow: TV= Daily average trade volume; ATV= Daily abnormal trade volume; MAT= Matching level 
measured based on Paek(2011b); GMAT= Matching level measured based on Lee and Jung(2014); DMAT= Matching level measured based on 
Jung and Lee (2014); PMAT= Matching level measured based on Prais-Winsten methods; VD= Voluntary disclosures(Voluntary disclosure 
level/ln((t-1)total assets)); SIZE= ln(total assets at the end of year); BIG=1 if the auditor is big 4, or 0; LEV= Total liability/total assets at the end 
of year; BOD: Percentage of abnormal outside directors; UE= Unexpected earnings measured based on Han(2001). CFS= 1 if consolidated 
financial statements is announced, or 0; AGE= ln(the consecutive number of months listed on KOSPI) 
 
 
Table 3 provides the Pearson’s correlation between the variables used in empirical analysis. In Table 3, trading 
volume measured daily average trading volume (TV) and daily abnormal trading volume (ATV) are shown to have 
significantly negative correlation with MAT, GMAT and PMAT, respectively. DMAT is shown to have 
significantly negative correlation with ATV, but does not have a significant correlation with TV.  
 
Between trading volume and matching level measurements, all have shown significantly (p<1%) positive 
correlations. We found a statistically significant positive correlation between the trading volume measurements and 
voluntary disclosure (VD), debt ration (LEV) and unexpected earnings (UE) at 1% level (p<1%). But the trading 
volume measurements have significantly (p<1%) negative correlation with firm size (SIZE), auditor size (Big), 
excess outside director rate (BOD), and consolidated financial statements (CFS). finally, we found that trading 
volume measurements and firm age (AGE) do not have a significant correlation. 
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Table 3. Pearson’s Correlations between Variables 
 TV ATV MAT GMAT DMAT PMAT VD TV 1.0000       
ATV 0.8492*** 1.0000      MAT -0.1257*** -0.0996*** 1.0000     GMAT -0.1567*** -0.1436*** 0.7840*** 1.0000    DMAT -0.0230 -0.0372** 0.1395*** 0.1395*** 1.0000   PMAT -0.1210*** -0.1056*** 0.8895*** 0.8895*** 0.1498*** 1.0000  VD 0.0465*** 0.0596*** -0.0378** -0.0378** -0.0247 -0.0508** 1.0000 
SIZE -0.1984*** -0.1545*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** -0.0419*** 0.0470*** 0.2220*** 
BIG -0.1307*** -0.1058*** 0.0213 0.0213 -0.0269* 0.0187 0.0375 
LEV 0.1536*** 0.1590*** -0.0525*** -0.0525*** 0.0198 -0.0732 0.1693 
BOD -0.0624*** -0.0547*** -0.0285* -0.0285* 0.0101 -0.026*5 0.0230 
UE 0.0507*** 0.0410 0.0250 0.0250 0.0118 0.0238 -0.0036 
CFS -0.0434*** -0.0500*** 0.0511*** 0.0511*** -0.0046 0.0598*** 0.070***2 
AGE -0.0179 0.0035 -0.0901*** -0.0901*** -0.0757*** -0.0771*** -0.0105 
 
 SIZE BIG LEV BOD UE CFS AGE SIZE 1.0000       
BIG 0.3460*** 1.0000      LEV 0.1611*** 0.0385** 1.0000     BOD 0.1874*** 0.1019*** 0.0007 1.0000    UE -0.0060 0.0072 -0.0290* 0.0136 1.0000   CFS 0.3191*** 0.1045*** 0.0344** 0.0189 0.0263* 1.0000  AGE 0.1605*** -0.0002 0.0193 0.0306* 0.0026 0.0869*** 1.0000 
*, **,*** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Our regression results of equation (1) are in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 provides the results by measuring investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs with daily average trading volume (TV) and Panel B provides result by measuring investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs with daily abnormal trading volume (ATV). Panel A and Panel B’s model 1 and model 2 are 
the results of matching level measurements by MAT and GMAT, and model 3 and model 4 are the results of 
matching level measurements by DMAT and PMAT. 
 
In Panel A and Panel B of Table 4, the regression coefficient of matching level measurements (MAT, GMAT, 
DMAT and PMAT) are significantly negative value for all four models. This is consistent with the hypothesis, and 
this can be explained as matching level increases, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease.  
 
As a result of the control variables, regression coefficient of voluntary announcement degree (VD) showed a 
significantly (p<1%) negative values in each model. This can be interpreted as quantity of information increases, so 
does trading volume. Regression coefficient of firm size (SIZE) showed significantly ((p<1%)) negative value in 
each model. It mean that as firm size increases the level of information asymmetry decreases, thus investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs decrease as result. Regression coefficient of auditor Size (BIG) showed significantly (p<1%) 
negative values in each model. These results mean that high audit quality can be a factor to reduce the trading 
volume. Regression coefficient of debt ratio showed significantly (p<1%) positive values in each model. Therefore, 
the risk of financial statement and bankruptcy can be explained as increasing investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. 
Regression coefficient of excess outside director ratio (BOD) is significantly negative in each model. We did not 
expect the direction of sign on the regression coefficient of BOD. However, outside director policy is considered to 
contribute to lower investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. The regression coefficient of unexpected earnings have 
significantly positive value. This is consistent with the study result of Choi and Shin (1997), thus it can be explained 
that unexpected earnings can cause various explanations for investors. Regression coefficient of firm age showed 
positive value only in model 3 of Panel A and Panel B. Although this is consistent with the result from Kwon and 
Moon (2012), it suggests that firm age can increase trading volume in a limited way. However, regression 
coefficient of consolidated financial statement (CFS) is shown to have no significance in each model. 
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To summarize the results of Table 4, as matching level increases, trading volume decreases. This implies that as 
matching level increases, earnings quality increases, thus investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease. 
 
 
Table 4. Results of regression: the effect of matching level on investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 𝑇𝑉 𝐴𝑇𝑉 $,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐶𝐻$,& + 𝛽0𝑉𝐷$,& + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&	& + 𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝐺$,& + 𝛽:𝐿𝐸𝑉$,& + 𝛽<𝐵𝑂𝐷$,& + 𝛽>𝑈𝐸$,& + 𝛽@𝐶𝐹$,& + 𝛽C𝐴𝐺𝐸$,& + 𝛽+)𝑌𝐷$,& +𝛽++𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸$,& + 𝜀$,&  
Panel A: Dependent variable is daily average trade volume(TV) 
 Model 1 
(MATCH= MAT) 
Model 2 
(MATCH= GMAT) 
Model 3 
(MATCH= DMAT) 
Model 4 
(MATCH= PMAT) 
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Intercept 0.1126 14.83*** 0.1116 14.84*** 0.1079 14.27*** 0.1144 14.96*** 
MAT -0.0089 -5.59***       
GMAT   -0.0096 -7.38***     
DMAT     -0.0023 -2.47**   
PMAT       -0.0102 -5.58*** 
VD 0.0161 4.74*** 0.0153 4.51*** 0.0171 5.02*** 0.0161 4.72*** 
SIZE -0.0029 -10.47*** -0.0028 -10.11*** -0.0030 -10.74*** -0.0029 -10.52*** 
BIG -0.0032 -4.42*** -0.0032 -4.50*** -0.0032 -4.41*** -0.0032 -4.43*** 
LEV 0.0202 11.42*** 0.0196 11.07*** 0.0209 11.76*** 0.0201 11.31*** 
BOD -0.0055 -1.98** -0.0053 -1.91* -0.0048 -1.74* -0.0054 -1.95* 
UE 0.0021 3.54*** 0.0020 3.44*** 0.0020 3.42*** 0.0021 3.53*** 
CFS 0.0004 0.52 0.0006 0.79 0.0002 0.27 0.0005 0.57 
AGE 0.0007 1.46 0.0004 0.92 0.0009 1.93* 0.0007 1.58 
YD Included 
ICODE Included 
F-vlaue 12.62*** 13.05*** 12.15*** 12.62*** 
Adj.R2 0.1538 0.1586 0.1485 0.1537 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is daily abnormal trade volume (ATV) 
 model 1 
(MATCH= MAT) 
model 2 
(MATCH= GMAT) 
model 3 
(MATCH= DMAT) 
model 4 
(MATCH= PMAT) 
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Intercept 0.0672 9.85*** 0.0662 9.80*** 0.0625 9.19*** 0.0691 10.05*** 
MAT -0.0093 -6.45***       
GMAT   -0.0099 -8.52***     
DMAT     -0.0027 -3.12***   
PMAT       -0.0107 -6.48*** 
VD 0.0146 4.78*** 0.0138 4.51*** 0.0156 5.09*** 0.0146 4.76*** 
SIZE -0.0029 -11.54*** -0.0028 -11.14*** -0.0030 -11.84*** -0.0029 -11.60*** 
BIG -0.0031 -4.82*** -0.0032 -4.92*** -0.0031 -4.82*** -0.0031 -4.83*** 
LEV 0.0195 12.25*** 0.0189 11.87*** 0.0202 12.65*** 0.0193 12.13*** 
BOD -0.0049 -1.97** -0.0047 -1.90* -0.0042 -1.70* -0.0048 -1.94* 
UE 0.0017 3.21*** 0.0016 3.09*** 0.0016 3.07*** 0.0017 3.20*** 
CFS 0.0005 0.68 0.0007 0.99 0.0003 0.40 0.0005 0.74 
AGE 0.0006 1.47 0.0004 0.84 0.0008 1.98** 0.0007 1.60 
YD Included 
ICODE Included 
F-vlaue 7.91*** 8.45*** 7.36*** 7.92*** 
Adj.R2 0.0975 0.1044 0.0904 0.0976 
*Two-tailed t-tests, *, **,*** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables except for the following. YD is a dummy variable for year. ICODE is a 
dummy variable for industry. 
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4.3 Additional Analysis 
 
According to the literature, the regression coefficient of equation (6) β2 is shown to have relation with current 
revenue and current expense (Dichev & Tang, 2008; Paek, 2011a; Jung & Lee, 2014). They explained that, as the 
value of β2 increases, correlation of current profit and current expense increases, thus the regression coefficient of β2 
shows a matching level.  
 
However, they submitted equation (6) to OLS regression analysis. As mentioned above, if equation (6) is analyzed 
through OLS regression, the first autocorrelation problem can occur. So this study re-tested the hypothesis by 
considering each firm’s calculated β2 as matching level’s proxy after analyzing equation (6) by Prais-Winsten 
estimation method.  
 
As a result of analysis of equation (6) by Prais-Winsten estimation method, β2 average(median) of equation (6) was 
shown as 1.0107(1.0215) and the standard deviation was 0.2987. Paek (2011a) reports the average and the median as 
0.987 and 1.021, and the standard deviation was reported as 0.274.2 
 
Table 5 is the additionally analyzed result on the impact that matching level has on investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 
after measuring equation (6) β2 (PEXP2) by Prais-Winsten estimation method. Model 1 is the result of setting daily 
average trading volume (TV) as dependent variable, and model 2 is the result of setting Daily abnormal trading 
volume (ATV) as dependent variable. According to the analysis results, regression coefficient on PEXP2 is 
significantly negative at the 1% level in both model 1 and model 2. This is consistent with the result from Table 4, 
and it suggests that as matching level improves, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease. 
 
 
Table 5.  Additional Test: the effect of matching level (β2 measured based on Prais-Winsten methods) on investors’ 
heterogeneous beliefs 𝑇𝑉 𝐴𝑇𝑉 $,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃2$,& + 𝛽0𝑉𝐷$,& + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$,&	& + 𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝐺$,& + 𝛽:𝐿𝐸𝑉$,& + 𝛽<𝐵𝑂𝐷$,& + 𝛽>𝑈𝐸$,& + 𝛽@𝐶𝐹$,& + 𝛽C𝐴𝐺𝐸$,& + 𝛽+)𝑌𝐷$,& +𝛽++𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸$,& + 𝜀$,&  
 model 1(TV) model 2(ATV) 
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Intercept 0.1109 14.61*** 0.0649 9.51*** 
PEXP2 -0.0048 -4.49*** -0.0046 -4.73*** 
VD 0.0170 5.00*** 0.0155 5.08*** 
SIZE -0.0030 -10.63*** -0.0029 -11.73*** 
BIG -0.0031 -4.29*** -0.0030 -4.67*** 
LEV 0.0200 11.25*** 0.0194 12.10*** 
BOD -0.0050 -1.80* -0.0044 -1.76* 
UE 0.0020 3.30*** 0.0016 2.94*** 
CFS 0.0003 0.34 0.0003 0.46 
AGE 0.0008 1.80* 0.0008 1.89* 
YD Included 
ICODE Included 
F-vlaue 12.42*** 7.58*** 
Adj.R2 0.1515 0.0932 
*Two-tailed t-tests, *, **,*** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to the note of Table 2 for the definitions of the variables except for the following. PEXP2 is β2 of equation (6) measured by using 
Prais - Winsten methods. YD is a dummy variable for year. ICODE is a dummy variable for industry. 
 
	
  
                                                
2 It is inappropriate to compare equation (6) β2 value that was calculated by Prais-Winsten estimation method directly with β2 value that is being 
reported by Paek (2011a), but β2 that was measured by Prais-Winsten estimation method and the measured value through OLS regression analysis 
look to have similar dispersion with each other. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study analyzed the hypothesis that matching level and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs will have negative 
relation. Investors’ heterogeneous beliefs that were used in analysis were measured by trading volume, and trading 
volume was measured by the methodology of Morse (1981), Beaver (1968), Bamber (1987) and Ziebart (1990).  
 
The literature on trading volume argued that the trading volume increases when investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 
regarding intrinsic value of the firm is different. Therefore, they reported that, as unexpected earnings increase, so 
does trading volume, but as earnings quality, information asymmetry and information environment improve, trading 
volume decreases. 
 
The literature on matching level has explored the impact that improvement of matching level has on earnings quality, 
accumulated market adjusted return, foreign ownership, future earning response coefficient (FERC) and bond credit 
rating. However, they disregarded the problem of measuring matching level. This study has therefore suggested an 
additional proxy of matching level besides the proxy of matching level suggested by the literature. 
 
This study has used the calculated explanatory power (Adj.R2) as an additional proxy of matching level after 
analyzing the model of Paek (2011b) by Prais-Winsten estimation methodology. This can solve the problem of the 
first autocorrelation. We have conducted an analysis on how matching level affects investors’ heterogeneous beliefs 
by using the matching level measurement from the literature on matching level and the matching level measurement 
suggested by this study. 
 
To empirically analyze the hypothesis of this study, we used firm-year observation from 4,094 firms listed on 
Korean Stock Exchange over the period from 2003 to 2011. We found that matching level regression coefficient 
consistently showed significantly negative values for each measurement. Moreover, we also measured the calculated 
regression coefficient (β2) of current expenses as matching level response coefficient after analyzing Dichev and 
Tang’s (2008) matching level measuring model by Prais-Winsten estimation method. It showed that regression 
coefficient of the current expenses and trading volume have a negative correlation. This is consistent with this study, 
and it shows that as matching level improves, investors’ heterogeneous beliefs decrease. 
 
According to the microeconomics theory of Mas-Colell et al., (1995), trading volume can affect price changes. 
However, accounting studies analyze the information effect by using price change only. Therefore, this study is 
meaningful in that it conducted an analysis on the information effect of matching level through trading volume. This 
study is also expected to improve our understanding of the microscopic structure of the capital market. 
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